The ethics of the practice of freedom against female weakness’ morality

Abstract

Michel Foucault’s ethical proposal as the ethics of concern of the self intends to be an alternative to the Christian based morality that emphasize the value of the sacrifice and renunciation of the self. Within the context of his general philosophical concerns, Foucault thinks that these morals of self-renunciation are inserted within games of truth and social, political and cultural institutions of power that give rise to asymmetrical relationships with and between individuals. In this sense, he considers that his ethical proposal is a practice of freedom that implies individual’s liberation form those games of truth and power. This paper problematizes the extent into which this practice of freedom reaches this liberalization by highlighting the presence of important discursive strategies, embedded in the Greco-Roman tradition from which Foucault departs, that take for granted the weakness and incapacity of what is characterized as feminine. By way of a reflection that expresses both the way in which Kant’s morality can be thought of as ethics in Foucault’s sense, as well as the critique that the French philosopher has raised against some Kantian anthropological and moral ideas, the paper seeks to pave the way for refining the ethics of the care of the self from those patriarchal discourse’s strategies.