Argentina. Ha cursado sus estudios de Doctorado en Filosofía en la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Licenciada y Profesora en Filosofía por la misma casa de altos estudios. Investiga en el área de la filosofía práctica e historia de la ética particularmente la ética de Schopenhauer y las discusiones contemporáneas enmarcadas en las éticas de la virtud. Actualmente, enseña ética y epistemología en instituciones de nivel terciario y universitario, y forma parte de dos equipos de investigación radicados en el Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades (Ciffyh) de la Universidad Nacional de Córdoba.
Jerome Schneewind points out that, contrary to what is often supposed by many Kantian scholars, the question of happiness plays a very important role within his thought. Schneewind´s assessment seems correct. When one confronts the Kantian writings, especially those concerning his ethics, it is pretty clear that in Kant´s eyes, happiness constitutes a significant matter. Likewise, this philosophical examination of happiness emerges even connected with other dimensions of his system, such as his philosophy of history and religion. In despite of the multiple perspectives from which the topic of happiness admits to be inspected in the context of Kant´s philosophy, in this paper I will focus exclusively in the objections he raises against the principle of happiness mainly in his second Critique. Accordingly, I will attempt to offer here not only a reconstruction but also an analysis of such criticisms.
