Between the humanist tradition and the neopragmatism: Richard Rorty and philosophy’s literary turn

Abstract

This essay argues that the post-analytical and post-philosophical thinking of Richard Rorty can assume a role –of prophylactic nature– of much interest to scholars within the tradition of literary studies and literary criticism in general: Rorty’s critical reflections serve as a warning against certain scientificistic claims from philosophy and literary theories. The human uses of language and its goals as an interpretative act –such as in literary criticism– go beyond the modern notion of truth as correspondence; the purpose of the criticism is, therefore, not to reach "the truth", but simply to continue and to enrich the wide and endless conversation human culture is. The criticism can only say "truths" if we understand that word in a humanistic-pragmatic sense and not, as does the traditional rationalist philosophy, understanding truth as certainty and as correspondence. For a neopragmatist, we should abandon, once and for all, the quest for a general theory of representation or for a general theory of language; likewise, transferring this concept to the literary domain, we should too spare us from the successive attempts to create a general unique theory of interpretation and literary criticism, or the pursuit of a monistic and definitive methodology: criticism is a plural activity that meets various demands and goals