Italiano. Doctor en Filosofía por la Università degli Studi di Torino. Ha realizado investigaciones post-doctorales en Torino, Heidelberg y París. Es autor de los libros: L’esperienza della verità (2011), Modalità ed esistenza (2009), Teorie del giudizio (2005), Il postmoderno (2002), Hegel, Heidegger e la grammatica dell’essere (1996) y Scrittura e técnica. Derrida e la metafísica (1992). Actualmente es Profesor del Departamento de Filosofía de la Università degli Studi di Torino y es Director, junto con Gianni Vattimo, de Trópos. Rivista di ermeneutica e critica filosófica
Gadamer’s vindication of the extra-methodical feature of truth in the human sciences put forward in Truth and Method does not mean a mere refusal of method: rather, it arises from the awareness that there are truths which are not reducible to the conditions of repeatability and commensurability set up by methodical thinking. In fact, the truths of the human sciences refer to the ontological dimension of the contingent and the accidental, i.e. to the dimension of the historical. In this essay I aim at highlighting this ontological dimension, which for Aristotle is eminently that of the praxis and of human action. I will show that such an ontology is a consequence of the logical and ontological discussions which crisscrossed Greek thought after the discovery of the incommensurable magnitudes. The ontology of praxis is an ontology which takes into account the “irrationality” represented by the contingent, the accidental, to which a new form of rationality corresponds: that of phrónesis. Phrónesis is in fact not a commensurative but a mediative rationality
